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To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper of its kind to analyze the gender 
representativeness of bureaucrats cross-nationally. It discusses the dearth of comparative 
representative bureaucracy literature and places this paper within the context of American 
scholarly literature on representative bureaucracy. After commenting on the disconnect between 
these literatures and the broad-based international developing literature, it uses panel-corrected 
time series data in attempt to narrow these scholarly divisions through representative 
bureaucracy research. My analysis finds that higher levels of income per capita are statistically 
significant predictors of the percentage of female civil servants at the central government and 
sub-national levels while greater fiscal decentralization and the percentage of female 
parliamentarians are also statistically significant predictors at the central government level. It 
concludes by noting that the commonality discovered across countries of women serving more 
frequently at the sub-national than central government levels requires further investigation. 
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“The act of participation in government itself is the vehicle for empowerment” (Wise, 1999, p. 568)  
 
In a 1999 article on India and South Africa, Milton Esman declared that bureaucratic 
representativeness is an important tool for increasing government legitimacy (Esman, 1999). Despite this 
observation from one of America’s top comparative public administration scholars, it remains empirically 
unexplored cross-nationally. By analyzing the representativeness of female bureaucrats at the national and 
sub-national levels, this paper begins to bridge that gap. It asks whether proxies for the structural, political 
and economic features of a country have a bearing on the gender representativeness of female civil 
servants at the national and sub-national levels. Beginning first with an overview of what is understood 
within the American representative bureaucracy literature before attempting to link this understanding 
with broader international currents, the paper will then delve into a discussion of the variables of interest, 




Representative Bureaucracy: An American Project? 
There is remarkable agreement about whom to credit the discovery of representative bureaucracy. 
In 1944, J. Donald Kingsley coined the term “representative government” in a study of British civil 
servants (Kingsley, 1944; Krislov, 1974). Observing gender and class distinctions within the British civil 
service, he noted that as British society became middle-class, its civil service might also become 
inhabited by the middle-class. Unlike later research that normatively explores both gender and ethnic 
representation within the civil service, Kingsley merely argued that “representational participation” 
should lead to “functional effectiveness” (Kingsley, 1944). Nevertheless, his observations launched a 
field of inquiry into representative bureaucracy. 
In 1948, Dwight Waldo’s discipline-changing argument that there was no dichotomy between 
politics and administration implied that civil servants are political creatures. As one modern-day author 
wrote, “If bureaucracy were always neutral in its values, always obeyed elected superiors, and always 
limited its activities to the enforcement of public laws and rules, then most controversies surrounding 
bureaucracy would melt away” (Jreisat, 2002, p. 37). This departure from the earlier public administration 
orthodoxy made it possible for public administration scholars to consider that the sociopolitical 
appearance of civil servants also mattered. In other words, bureaucracies, their civil services and the civil 
servants themselves are not apolitical machines. Civil servants perform inherently political tasks and 
discretion is utilized in the performance of the tasks. The idea behind representative bureaucracy research 
in America was two-fold. If we encourage representative bureaucracy, the policies that bureaucrats help 
design and then later implement will better reflect the citizenry they serve. And second, that it we wish to 
better understand the discretionary outputs of civil servants, we should study the sociopolitical and 
socioeconomic characteristics of those who filled the civil servant shoes.  
On a more theoretical level, if one allows for the fact that representativeness matters within an 
administrative structurethis implies one’s agreement that civil servants are not apolitical actors. In 
contrast, the belief that the Weberian model is either normatively ideal and/or is empirically most efficient 
suggests that the administrative structures are uniquely apolitical facilitators of policy; separate from the 
politicized legislative or executive leadership positions. Analysis of bureaucratic systems in other 
countries indicates that among the non-politically appointed civil servants, this assumption of American 
public administration may not hold cross-nationally (Derlien, 2003; Drewry, 2003) or even whether this 
dichotomy is uniquely American. While this concept cannot be studied in detail within this paper, we can 
begin to attack this problem by looking at how gender is distributed within the civil services in other 
countries. 
Nevertheless, by the 1950s and 1960s public administration scholars began to normatively argue 
that it mattered “which set of bureaucrats” controlled the policy process (Lipset, 1950). Intellectual jumps 
were being made from the assumed political nature of civil servant work to determining whether these 
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bureaucrats were themselves representative of their broader public. Bureaucratic representativeness was 
pertinent since it “provide[d] a means of fostering equity in the policy process by helping to ensure that 
all interests are represented in the formulation and implementation of policies and programs” (Coleman, 
Brudney, & Kellough, 1998, p. 719). By the large, over time, scholars came to agree that representative 
bureaucracy increases government legitimacy, accountability, effectiveness, and participation (Dolan & 
Rosenbloom, 2003). For the purpose of this paper, it is assumed that representative bureaucracy a priori 
is beneficial. 
Passive and Active Representation: Civil Service and Legislative Literatures 
Scholarly research has differentiated two types of representative bureaucracy: passive and active. 
Using gender as an example, passive representation occurs when the number of female civil servants 
mirrors the ratio of employment-age women within society. Active representation occurs when female 
civil servants use their position to affect policy options favorable to women (Keiser, Wilkins, Meier, & 
Holland, 2002; Mosher, 1968; Nachmias & Rosenbloom, 1973). While few would argue that a civil 
service representative of the gender, religious or ethnic differences of the citizenry is an unworthy 
objective, disagreements exist about if and when these civil servants become active representatives of 
their sociopolitical trait(s). 
It has been argued that a passive representation of women can affect the public organization, but 
that it need not lead to active representation (Hindera, 1993; Selden, 1997). Others hypothesized that what 
mattered was not which societal group the bureaucracy represented but that what was important was the 
power of the agency itself, as an entity, to influence policy outcomes favorable to the groups represented 
in society (Romzek & Hendricks, 1982). Moving to active representation, American scholars ask “[w]hen 
are female bureaucrats merely “standing for” women and when might we expect them to “act for” 
women” (Keiser, Wilkins, Meier, & Holland, 2002, p. 553). Keiser, et al (2002) argued that not only 
bureaucratic structures that influence civil servants, but that the civil servants themselves symbiotically 
influence the structure. The researchers found an empirical link between passive and active 
representation, in particular in relatively flat institutional hierarchies. Furthermore, men and women react 
differently to their roles as administrators and that specifically, women “devote more time on both 
developing policy and garnering public support” (Bowling, Kelleher, & Wright, 2005, p. 16). In a study 
on the impact of minority teachers on the standardized test performance of Texas students, it was 
determined that increases in minority teachers lead to increased performance for both minority and Anglo 
students. The study concludes “[r]epresentative bureaucracies are more effective at meeting their goals 
than non-representative bureaucracies in similar circumstances” (Meier, Wrinkle, & Polinard, 1999, p. 
1037).i  
Within the American legislative branch literature, scholars have found that women seek office 
and are elected to office more frequently at the sub-national level than the national level. Once in office, 
female legislators often view policy issues differently from men and are more likely “act for” women by 
creating policies beneficial to this constituency (Thomas, 1994). A study of female appointees to public 
office in the late 1970s and early 1980s confirmed these observations for the highest levels of public 
service. The author found that appointed women more often held feminist views and “were inspired and 
assisted by other women” (Rajoppi, 1983, p. 93).  
Representative Bureaucracy Cross-Nationally: Why it Never Became a Priority  
 Where does representative bureaucracy fit into broader comparative trends of comparative 
research? The disappointing answer is that it is not a priority for either comparative public administration 
scholars or among those international financial institutions and aid agencies that influence civil service 
development of dozens of developing nations. This paper posits that the reason for the first omission has 
been a historical lack of data and the reason for the second is related to first along with an 
acknowledgement that the neoliberal agenda and its efficiency-first method espoused by these 




The fact that comparative public administration has long suffered from deficient data is not new. 
The case study movement that spearheaded the 1950s era in American public administration would be 
transferred to comparative public administration in the 1960s and 1970s by such comparative leaders as 
Fred Riggs and Milton Esman (Esman, 1970; Jreisat, 2002; Riggs, 1970). These case studies, following 
the methodological trends of the broader social science community, were predominately qualitative with 
descriptive statistics included as available and on an as-needed basis. The trend for one-country case 
studies or one-country studies of aspects of administrative system has continued today. Broad-based data 
gathering objectives on public administration systems, functions, or processes have been, and continue to 
not be, scholarly priorities. 
Instead, comparative public administration scholars sought to use their case studies to create 
administrative typologies that modeled bureaucracy and/or its functions and processes (Braibanti, 1970; 
Diamant, 1970; Eisenstadt, 1967; Heady, 1970; Jreisat, 2002; Katz, 1970; LaPalombara, 1970; Waldo, 
1967). Others trained developing country public administrators on how to Westernize their local 
bureaucracy and civil service (Braibanti, 1970; Esman, 1970; Viswanathan, 1995).iii American scholars 
busied themselves listing normative reasons behind the “failures” of public administration in the 
developing world, and as importantly, repeatedly trying and failing to implement a Weberian ideal-type 
bureaucratic system within the developmental context (Esman, 1970; Haque, 1997). Conspicuously 
absent was an emphasis on representative bureaucracy. Further hampering discussion of representative 
bureaucracy is the fact that the bureaucratic unit, as a whole, has been and continues to be favored unit of 
analysis (Tummala, 2003). As a result, comparative investigations of even civil service systems and much 
less, their representative aspects, remain at best “unavailable or tentative” (Jreisat, 2002, p. 19).  
At the same time, scholars in the field of comparative politics were making scholarly 
contributions that would change the field of focus for internationally oriented public administration 
scholars. In 1960, Walter Rostow argued that all countries could be placed along one of five stages of 
economic development: the traditional society, the pre-conditions for take-off, the drive to economic 
security, and in the stage where most Western nations fell, the age of mass consumption (Rostow, 1960). 
The common policy denominator was that modernization could be achieved through economic reform. 
Certain comparative public administration scholars and political scientists who concerned themselves 
with study of bureaucracy found room for modernization theory in their studies (Braibanti, 1970; Esman, 
1970) but more generally, the comparative politics scholars were organizing around another trend 
whereby the primacy given to politics and administration for “solving” problems of development would 
soon become eclipsed.  
Rostow’s work would lead to the primacy of a new group of social scientists: the economists. 
And here is where the separation between comparative public administration and international 
development would see its first fissures. At the 1968 Minnowbrook Conference at Syracuse University, 
public administration scholars found themselves frustrated observers of the political and social changes 
occurring in America. Viewing the field of public administration as still unable to build a theory of public 
administration, and worse, after years of case studies, unable to predict or solve the then present-day 
social movements, the scholars sought to create a “new” public administration. This “new” focus asked 
public administrators to involve themselves in an inherently political task: improving “social equity.” For 
these scholars, their tools included decentralization and representative bureaucracy. Decentralization “was 
viewed as one means of clarifying and strengthening the link between the bureaucracy and the citizenry” 
(Ingraham & Rosenbloom, 1989, p. 121). While this focus on decentralization as a method for improving 
policy-citizen linkage would resurface years later among World Bank economists, the field of American 
public administration would turn inward and begin, in earnest, a research agenda that considered 
representative bureaucracy in greater detail. 
More recently, the evolving re-interest of comparative politics scholars in the “state” and of 
international donor agencies in “governance” has led us to the early stage of broader-based dataset 
development. Many of these datasets only began their active life in the early to mid-1990s and as such, 
their usefulness beyond small-year studies is not yet upon us. Even though this study will draw from the 
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more established Government Finance Statistics compiled by International Monetary Fund (IMF), this 
study would not be possible without use of the newly compiled governance database of the World Bank. 
More detail will follow in the Methodology nad Data section. 
Representative Bureaucracy: Still Not an International Priority 
The resulting fascination within the development community over economic theory led to fiscal 
reform, trade liberalization, and privatization policies (implemented via “structural adjustment” packages) 
to dominate international development from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s. With many developing 
countries facing high debt/GNP ratios and low or inconsistent annual growth, structural adjustment was 
viewed as the cure and necessary condition for further international assistance. By 1989, the development 
community had put together a list of ten “lessons learned” from these development practices. If this so-
called “Washington Consensus” incentivized the fiscal and market structures of an economy, the newly 
emerging “second-generation” reforms of the mid-1990s would focus on just the opposite, incentivizing 
and reforming institutions.  
This rediscovery of governance was brought about by new analyses indicating that structural 
adjustment reforms, while reducing inflation and overall economic uncertainty, occurred at a cost: an 
increase in poverty and inequality (WorldBank, 1997). The primary tool for rediscovering governance 
and the importance of the state and its institutions was decentralization. According to one author, this 
conception of the state and its institutions exists because international financial institutions like the World 
Bank see “… no solid line connecting citizens and government appointees, only elected officials, not 
bureaucrats, represent citizens. The adherents of this interpretation seek the protection of democratic 
values from an assumed influx of “bureaucratic despotism” (Jreisat, 2002, p. 92). Among World Bank 
policymakers, decentralization is policy tool considered capable of promoting newly-important “pro-
poor” development policies such as increasing political legitimacy, empowering disadvantaged groups 
(by ethnicity or by gender), and strengthening local community participation (WorldBank, 2002a). Its 
familiarity to scholars supportive of the social equity movement within public administration should 
recognize familiar ideas, even if they disagree with the Bank of the proper solution. 
Unlike “representative bureaucracy,” there is little agreement as to how to define decentralization. 
Since the decentralization data for this study are from the IMF and the World Bank, their definitions are 
utilized. Most broadly stated, “[d]ecentralization is a multi-dimensional process that involves the transfer 
of political, fiscal and administrative responsibilities and powers from the central government to 
intermediate and local governments” (Litvack, Ahmad, & Bird, 1998; WorldBank, n.d.-b). There are three 
generally agreed-upon types of decentralization: political, fiscal, and administrative. Fiscal 
decentralization is defined by the World Bank as the transferring of “expenditure responsibilities and 
revenue assignments to lower levels of government” (WorldBank, n.d.-c). In practice, the World Bank 
only publishes cross-national data on the share of sub-national expenditures and tax revenues as a 
percentage of national expenditures and tax revenues without referencing the authority or ability of the 
sub-national governments to collect, spend, or manage these monies (WorldBank, 2000). The authority to 
do that task at the sub-national level requires administrative decentralization while merely having a 
jurisdictional area below the nation-state requires political decentralization. Due to data limitations, this 
study focuses only the linkage between fiscal decentralization and civil servant gender 
representativeness.iv  
Reforming the governing institutions of developing countries has been a long-term focus of the 
World Bank. The decentralization of those institutions along neo-liberal lines is a newer occurrence. 
Given World Bank leadership in international development policy and practice, its projects are an 
indicator of development priorities. The World Bank approved its first project with a decentralization 
component in 1975 and 12 more projects would be approved in the 1970s and 1980s. Between 1990 and 
1997, 151 projects with a decentralization component were deployed. With the World Bank’s publication 
of Beyond the Washington Consensus: Institutions Matter (WorldBank, 1997), approval for projects with 
a decentralization component doubled. Since 1998, over 300 more have been approved at a rate of 37 
projects per year and total cost of $23 billion. Even though the World Bank relates decentralization and 
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public administration within the projects, civil service representativeness is infrequently discussed. 
Instead, civil servant (re) training, (re) appropriation of their functions, creating effective processes, and 
improving bureaucratic outcomes are goals. These topics are also key components of U.S.-based public 
administration research. Yet, a primary difference between U.S. research and the work of the international 
development community is the inattention of the latter to representative bureaucracy. 
In conclusion of this section, we must come to this “rediscovery” of the persistent, long-term, 
multi-dimensional nature of poverty. In response to this observation, over 190 countries agreed to eight 
development goals, which they insist will reduce world poverty in half by 2015. The third of these so-
called Millennium Development Goals is the empowerment of women and the promotion of gender 
equity. The quantitative measures for determining progress include measures of literacy, the percentages 
of women serving in parliament, and shares of wage employment (UnitedNations, 2005). Arguing that 
these measures of empowerment are important, but not sufficient, this study goes beyond calls for 
increased gender equity in the legislature to explore gender equity within the civil service. 
Measuring Passive Representation Cross-Nationally 
Even though the debates on active representation are more “current” within the U.S.-based public 
administration literature, this paper cannot make the assumption that active representation of civil 
servants is of sociopolitical importance cross-nationally in part because available data do not allow 
individual-level or agency-level analysis. In other words, data limitations shunt our ability to study 
representative bureaucracy cross-nationally in any form other than passive representation. This is a 
similar starting point to where representative bureaucracy began its own research in the 1970s, that is, 
only focused on passive and not active, representation (Dolan & Rosenbloom, 2003).  
In the 1970s, this literature frequently looked at the political and economic backgrounds of civil 
servants. Able to use individual or agency-level data, variables explored included: age of civil servant 
(Bullard & Wright, 1993; Meier & Nigro, 1976), ethnicity of civil servant (Barnett, Baron, & Smart, 
2000; Eisinger, 1982; Meier & Stewart Jr, 1992; Rosenbloom & Featherstonhaugh, 1977), previous civil 
service employment (Barnett, Baron, & Smart, 2000), father’s occupation (Meier, 1975; Meier & Nigro, 
1976), political views or political activity of civil servant (Bullard & Wright, 1993; Meier, 1975; 
Rosenbloom & Featherstonhaugh, 1977), salary level (Barnett, Baron, & Smart, 2000; Lewis, 1996; 
Meier, 1975; Meier & Stewart Jr, 1992; Wise, 1999), educational specialization, (Bullard & Wright, 
1993), region (Meier & Nigro, 1976), hours worked by civil servant (Bullard & Wright, 1993), regulatory 
and redistributive functions of agencies (Miller, Kerr, & Reid, 1999) or work habits, gender of mentor, 
organizational factors (Naff, 2001). It is important to note that none of these variables are currently 
available cross-nationally. Several of the above variables attempt to understand the work environment and 
past experiences of the civil servants. Others, more relevant to this study, are exploring sociopolitical and 
socioeconomic perspectives.  
In 1976, Meier and Nigro explored the regional origin of civil servants to see if there was a 
urban-rural bias (Meier & Nigro, 1976). In contrast, this paper explores geographical space quite 
differently. If, in the legislative literature, women are more likely to seek political office at the sub-
national (i.e. state, province, city, town) levels, we should if they also more likely to serve as civil 
servants at the sub-national level as well? Looking at data from the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) shows that indeed, more American women served as civil servants at the sub-national levels (58.7 
percent) than at the national level (42.7 percent) between 1996 and 2004 (See Table 1). If it is true that 
women do serve more frequently at the local levels, what might be the reasons? One option is structural. 
That is, due the federalized nature of the American system, there are opportunities available for women to 
serve at the local level. These opportunities may not be available in countries either where the central 
government drives policy and action and/or there is no decentralization of policy-making, implementation 
or even tax and spend authorities. This lack of U.S.-based research on this topic is primarily due to the 
relatively unchanging federal nature of federal, state and local structures as well as the fact that 
comparative research has not, until recently within the international development arena, considered a 
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decentralized structure as a prerequisite to greater accountability, representativeness and government 
effectiveness. 
With the unit of analysis for this study remaining at country and sub-national levels,v available 
proxies for measuring political and economic opportunities include both measures of gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita (US$)(2000), a voice and accountability index, and the percentage of female 
parliamentarians. The proxy variable for understanding structural differences will be a measure of fiscal 
decentralization. Each of these variables will be discussed in greater detail in the next section on 
Methodology and Data. 
 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
Method 
Two sets of panel-corrected time series model are analyzed. The units of analysis are countries 
and the time period under consideration is 1996-2004. This time period was selected not only for where 
and when the data is most complete, but as importantly so as to include the voice and accountability index 
which only began data collection in 1996. The differences between the two models are its dependent 
variables. The dependent variable for the central government model is the percentage of female civil 
servants within central governments while the dependent variable for the sub-national models is the 
percentage of female civil servants within sub-national governments.  
Each set of models includes three versions of the model (sub-models). All six sub-models include 
a transformed income variable of gross national product per capita. Following trends elsewhere, this 
variable was transformed into a log. Each model also includes a proxy for political rights: a voice and 
accountability index. This index required no transformation. All models also include a version of the key 
structural variable, the percentage of fiscal decentralization. Due to missing data, two of the three models 
required that the mean level of fiscal decentralization (averaged among available years) be included 
instead of each value per year. The third sub-model within each level of government adds a fourth 
variable: percentage of female parliamentarians, which was also transformed by a log. To summarize: 
 
Central Government Models 
Model C1: % of Women_Central = β0 – βXFiscal_Decentralization + βXVoice_&_Accountability + (log) βXGDP_per_capita  
Model C2: % of Women_Central = β0 – βXFiscal_MEAN + βXVoice_&_Accountability + (log)βXGDP_per_capita 
Model C3: % of Women_Central = β0 – βXFiscal_MEANn + βXVoice_&_Accountability + (log)βXGDP_per_capita + 
(log)βXFemale_Parliamentarians 
 
Sub-National Government Models 
Model SN1: % of Women_Central = β0 + βXFiscal_Decentralization + βXVoice_&_Accountability + (log)βXGDP_per_capita  
Model SN2: % of Women_Central = β0 + βXFiscal_MEAN + βXVoice_&_Accountability + (log)βXGDP_per_capita 




• Women_Central: Number of female civil servants as a proportion of total civil servants at the central 
government level. 
• Women_Sub-National: Number of female civil servants as a proportion of total civil servants at the 
regional and local government level. 
• Fiscal_Decentralization: Sub-national expenditures (as % of national expenditures). 
• Fiscal_MEAN: The mean rate per country of sub-national expenditures as a percentage of national 
expenditures. 
• Voice_&_Accountability: Measure of voice and accountability (civil, human, and political rights). 
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• GDP_per_capita: Gross domestic product per capita (US$ in year 2000 dollars) 
• Female_Parliamentarians: Number of female parliamentarians as a proportion of total 
parliamentarians. 
 
Dependent Variable Data 
Gender Equity within the Civil Service (Central and Sub-National Levels) 
There is no singly accepted measure of representative bureaucracy. The first widely discussed 
measure was the “Nachmias-Rosenbloom Measure of Integration” (Nachmias & Rosenbloom, 1973). 
This index postulates a mathematical formulation whereby integration is the total number of social 
characteristics (say, gender or ethnicity) and the frequency of those characteristics within the group you 
are measuring. This measure has been praised as having significant measurement validity (Guajardo, 
1996), but, in measures with just two variables (such male/female) it leads to questions over its linearity. 
Another common measure is to determine the percentage of target group in a bureaucracy (say Hispanic 
women) and divide that by the percentage of Hispanic women in the surrounding community. However, 
as Meier and Stewart (1991) point out, this measure can be sensitive to extreme values (Meier & Stewart 
Jr, 1992). Others measure female representation by dividing the percentage of working-age women in the 
population by the percentage of female civil servants (Sigelman, 1976). This latter option appears most 
reasonable, however, given the paucity of data cross-nationally on the numbers of working age women, 
this paper instead divides the number of women in the civil service by the total number of civil servants. 
The resulting variable is the percentage of female civil servants at the central government or sub-national 
government levels. This measure has the advantage of being more robust cross-nationally as it diminishes 
any differences in the number of civil service positions as a percentage of employable positions within 
society. A country where one-third of all employment is in the state sector will be equalized to a country 
with five percent of available employment occurring within the civil service. 
There are two dependent variables in this study: percent of female civil servants at the national 
and percent of female civil servants at the sub-national level.vi The employment data is available from the 
International Labor Organization’s LABORSTA database (ILO, 2004). Even though data is available 
from 1985 to 2004, for this paper the range utilized is 1996 to 2004.vii The data is an interval variable with 
a scale of 0 to 100 percent. The closer a percentage is to 50 percent, the more gender-equitable is the sub-
national or central government under discussion. Three notes of caution are required for the dependent 
variable data. First, not every country surveyed has both regional and local political jurisdictions. If a 
country has both regional and local jurisdictions, the employment data was added together for each 
gender before creating the dependent variable. Second, none of the countries included had dependent 
variable data for all years. Third, groupings of 30, 40 and 37 countries were included in the central 
government sub-models C1, C2 and C3 while for the sub-national models, groups of 17, 24 and 22 were 
included, respectively (see Tables 6-11).viii The average number of observations (out of six possible) per 
central government model is 1.7, 4.1 and 3.5 and 1.6, 3.6, and 3.1 for the sub-nationals models.ix  
Independent Variable Data 
Fiscal Decentralization 
There are several potential measures of fiscal decentralization. Operationally, fiscal 
decentralization involves differing expenditures and revenue-collecting responsibilities between levels of 
government, intergovernmental grant systems, and monitoring of flows between government levels 
(Ahmad, Devarajan, Khemani, & Shah, 2005). Not all governments apply the same operational 
mechanisms and some countries may have regulatory rules on the books, but their practices may differ. 
Other scholars measure fiscal decentralization as fiscal transfers (Ndegwe, 2002). For this paper, the 
fiscal decentralization data is from the IMF’s 2001 Government Finance Statistics (IMF, 2001). It is 
reported as an interval variable ranging from 0 to 100 percent where 100 percent means complete fiscal 
decentralization. Fiscal decentralization is measured as sub-national expenditures (as % of total 
expenditures) in order to equalize legal and regulatory differences across countries (Fisman & Gatti, 
2000). The practice in other scholarly papers has been to report expenditures as an average over the years 
 
10 
in which data is available. This practice is continued in two of the sub-models (C2, C3 and SN2, SN3) for 
each of the central government and sub-national models. As a point of comparison only, the non-averaged 
scores are included in models C1 and SN1. As it turns out, the mean level of fiscal decentralization per 
country versus the inclusion of each fiscal decentralization indicators per country is highly correlated at 
0.9905. This high correlation underscores a reason behind earlier authors only reporting this value as a 
mean. However, given that one research question of this paper is whether greater fiscal decentralization 
impacts gender representation and thus, we may find differences across years, my models reflect both 
calculations.  
It is expected that higher levels of fiscal decentralization (or fiscal mean) will be positively 
related to the number of women employed at the sub-national level. It may be that the more money sub-
national governments have to spend, the greater the opportunity for increased civil service employment 
opportunities and by extension, more opportunities for female employment. In contrast, we expect to find 
a negative relationship between fiscal decentralization (or fiscal mean) and the percentage of female civil 
servants at the central government level. This relationship is expected for different reasons than the sub-
national model. While national governments generally have more money to spend than sub-national 
governments, national governments are located in capital cities where women have other employment 
opportunities. In addition, at the sub-national levels, women who wish to serve as public servants can do 
so more easily without moving themselves and their families to the central seat of government. To 
summarize: 
H1: There will be a negative relationship between percentage of female 
civil servants at the central government level and higher levels of fiscal 
decentralization. 
H2: There will be a positive relationship between percentage of female 
civil servants at the sub-national government level and higher levels of 
fiscal decentralization. 
Voice and Accountability 
The Voice and Accountability Index is from the World Bank’s Aggregate Governance Indicators 
database (1996-2004). The governance indicators were compiled from nearly three-dozen sources 
including survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations 
and measures political, civil and human rights. The index was created biennially from 1996 until 2002 
and then annually thereafter. It is a continuous variable with each country given a value between –2.5 to 
2.5. The highest value (2.5) is for countries with greatest amount of voice and accountability while the 
lowest value (–2.5) is for those with the least. This range of scores is equivalent to z-scores where a score 
of 2.5 indicates that a country is 2.5 standard deviations away from the mean (Kaufmann, 2005). The 
greater the freedom available for women to express their opinion, the more likely they are to not only be 
eligible for outside employment, but, if they chose a civil service career, believe they can express their 
opinion within the civil service environment. It is expected that countries with greater voice and 
accountability will positively related to the percentage of female civil servants at the central and sub-
national levels. To summarize: 
H3: There will be a positive relationship between percentage of female 
civil servants at the central government level and higher voice and 
accountability scores. 
H4: There will be a positive relationship between percentage of female 
civil servants at the sub-national government level and higher voice and 
accountability scores. 
GDP per capita (US$)(2000) 
The gross domestic product (GDP), measured on a per capita basis is our income variable. This 
data is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. All data is in 2000 US$ and is logged, as 
is the custom with cross-national income variables. Rises in income have long been considered important 
drivers for international development and gender equity. Lower-income countries tend to have greater 
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gender inequality while within countries, those are the poorest are also often suffering from gender 
barriers (WorldBank, 2002b). Thus, it is expected that higher incomes will lead to societies where not 
only women will enter the formal economy, but where it is reasonable to expect that women may also feel 
free choose civil servant employment opportunities. To summarize: 
H5: There will be a positive relationship between percentage of female 
civil servants at the central government level and higher incomes. 
H6: There will be a positive relationship between percentage of female 
civil servants at the sub-national government level and higher incomes. 
Female Parliamentarians 
The percentage of female parliamentarians is the final variable. The data for this variable is from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. It is an interval variable reported as the percentage of 
parliamentarians. As far as this author is aware, there is almost no theoretical or empirical research 
linking the number of female parliamentarians to the number of female civil servants despite numerous 
articles discussing each literature separately. While certain countries advocate that a minimum percentage 
of seats are reserved for women, it is not expected to impact whether a woman decides to run for office or 
to serve in office as a public servant. This is assumed despite the fact that others have observed limited 
talent pools for female parliamentarians (Mezey, 1994; Miller, Kerr, & Reid, 1999). It is expected that 
female parliamentarians are influenced by similar political and economic conditions as female civil 
servants and therefore, we expect a positive relationship between the number of female parliamentarians 
and the number of female civil servants at the central sub-national level. To summarize: 
H7: There will be a positive relationship between percentage of female 
civil servants at the central government level and countries with higher 
percentages of female parliamentarians. 
H8: There will be a positive relationship between percentage of female 
civil servants at the sub-national government level and countries with 




 Starting first with the central government models, Table 12 indicates that fiscal decentralization 
was a statistically significant predictor (p < .01) of the percentage of female civil servants within central 
governments. The observations within the U.S.-based representative bureaucracy literature that women 
are more likely to serve at the sub-national levels as opposed to the central government level are also 
likely to occur cross-nationally. Among the countries included in each of the central government models, 
the United States consistently has one of the highest levels of fiscal decentralization. Its ratio of central 
(58.7 percent) to sub-national female (42.7 percent) employment is also reflective of trends elsewhere 
(See Tables 1, 6-11).x In other words, while we cannot say that decentralized structures are entirely 
responsible for predicting female employment at the central government level, we can be more than 99 
percent confident that it is a statistically significant predictor. We cannot be so certain of its importance at 
the sub-national levels since it was not statistically significant (See Table 13). Income was also a 
statistically significant predictor of female employment at the central government level. In fact, it was the 
only statistically significant predictor of any variable within the sub-national models (See Tables 12, 13). 
While its statistical significance varied from greater than 90 percent to greater than 99 percent confidence, 
its positive relationship across all six models indicates that as income per capita increases, women are 
more likely to find themselves employed at both central and sub-national governments. 
 Looking at our descriptive statistics, a potential reason for this result is immediately clear. When 
we look at Tables 14 and 15, we find that the countries represented in each model are skewed toward 
higher-income countries. While 46.1 percent of all member countries of the World Bank are either upper-
middle or high income countries, in these particular models, these two income categories range from 75.0 
(Model C2) to 86.4 percent (Model SN3) of all countries included in the models. Table 14 also indicates 
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that only one of the potentially 54 low-income countries was included in any of these models. While this 
country (India) is clearly a disproportionately large country in terms of its population, another 53 
countries never had enough data to be were included. Most often these low-income countries had valid 
data points for either income and/or voice/accountability but would not have either sufficient fiscal 
decentralization or gendered employment data. This is due, in part to the difficulty of collecting such data, 
which is discussed more in detail in the concluding section.  
 Of greater interest however, is that fact that despite these data collection problems our descriptive 
statistics indicate a broader trend outside of the regression models. The limitation (and benefit) of 
regression models is that for a country to be included, it must have data points for each of the variables 
for that year. This naturally benefits those countries that are most able to collect such data. However, what 
is not included in these regression models are data points from the many countries that could not have 
been included, but if had, may have lead to similar results. According to Table 3, data was available for 
87 countries and total of 476 observations at the central government level. With a mean percentage of 
female civil servants at 41.2 percent, this indicates that 87 of the 208 member countries of the World 
Bank (~40 percent) employ more men than women at the central government level. While more than half 
of these countries were dropped when placed into a regression, our regression results indicate a similar 
story. With a mean rate of 41.2 percent for women at the central government level, our three models 
included countries with similar rates. Even though these rates were slightly biased upward in each model 
(43.8, 44.8, and 45.5 percent for Models C1-C3, respectively), they still match the perception that women 
are less represented than men at the central government levels. 
This trend is not unique to either rich or poor countries. In most countries, women were less 
represented than men at the central government levels. Among all countries where data was available, the 
only countries where women out-numbered men for one or more years were Argentina (1996, 1998-
2000), Bahamas (1995-1999), Barbados (1997, 1999-2000), Belgium (1998-1999), Botswana (2000-
2002), Bulgaria (1996-2003), Colombia (1998, 2000-2003), Costa Rica (1998), Estonia (1995-2004), 
Greenland (1996), Isle of Man (1996, 2001), Latvia (1997-2004), Lithuania (1996-2003), Malaysia 
(1999), New Zealand (1995, 1997-2004), Norway (2002), Panama (1999), Philippines (1997-1999, 2001-
2004), Poland (1995-2003), San Marino (1995, 1998-2004), Slovenia (1995-1998), and Spain (1998).xi In 
many of these countries the ratio between men and women is very near to parity with Slovenia, Lithuania, 
Estonia and New Zealand averaging over 60 percent. Looking more closely, there seems to be little 
binding these countries together. Even though nearly half are from Europe (Western and Eastern) or are a 
developed countries, one is predominately Muslim (Malaysia) and some are quite large geographically 
(Philippines, Argentina) while several are not. The types of governmental styles vary as much as their 
incomes. The explanation for this diversity of countries may be as fascinating for explaining why 
countries we might have suspected should be included, were not. Finding this answer is beyond the scope 
of this paper and requires further country-by-country research and comparison. 
 Like the United States, the trend in countries was for more women to be represented at the sub-
national levels. Of the potential 32 countries (and 178 observations) of data, our models included 17, 22, 
and 24 of those countries, respectively. This ratio of inclusion is higher than the central government 
model presumably reflecting the fact that if a country can collect sub-national gender data they are also 
quite likely to consistently collect all the data required. The mean value of women represented at the sub-
national levels was 54.8, 53.5 and 55.6 percent for each of the sub-national models in comparison to the 
50.4 predicted from all of the available data, including those countries that did not make it into the final 
models. The sub-national models are biased toward countries with higher number of female civil servants 
at the sub-national level. Countries where men outnumbered women at the sub-national level included 
Albania (1995-2002), Australia (1995), Botswana (1995-1999), China (1995-1997), Costa Rica (1995-
1998), Ethiopia (1997-2000), Fiji (1996), Georgia (1998-1999), India (1995-2003), Japan (1996, 2001), 
Luxembourg (1997-2000), Malaysia (1995-2000), Mauritius (1995-2004), Netherlands (1995, 1997, 
2000-2003), New Zealand (1995, 1997-2004), Reunion (1995-1999), Russia (2000), Spain (1995-1999), 
and Zimbabwe (1995-1999). Like the central government models, the diversity among these countries is 
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equally astounding. Interestingly, several countries appeared on the central and sub-national lists and 
these are countries that show opposite patterns to the United States and to the rest of sample. The 
countries of Botswana, Malaysia, Spain, Costa Rica and New Zealand in one or more years had a majority 
of civil servants being female at the national level than the sub-national levels. Furthermore, in several 
countries including India, Mauritius and Zimbabwe, women held less than 30 percent of positions at both 
the sub-national and national levels. While in the case of India and Zimbabwe, one might easily argue this 
is due to cultural factors, in Mauritius, an upper-middle income country with a democratic tradition that 
currently must import labor to fulfill the requirements of its booming economy, the reasons are less clear. 
At first glance, there are no obvious similarities among these countries and thus, further research is clearly 
required to help dissect and to understand not only these difference, but why such broad differentiation 
have occurred cross-nationally. 
 Given that many of the countries included in these models were upper-middle or high income 
countries with a democratic tradition or even, in certain countries as just profiled, with women at or above 
gender parity, voice and accountability was surprisingly not a statistically significant predictor of either 
central or sub-national government employment of women. One potential reason for this outcome is again 
related to missing data, not for the indicator itself, but when combined with the others in the model. 
According to Table 3, this indicator had the broadest reach of countries. Of the 208 countries that are 
World Bank members, 204 had at least one year of data for voice and accountability. With a mean 
averaging near zero for these 1,361 observations, the skewing toward countries with high index level is 
quite large. Among central government models, the mean ranged from .683 to .740 while for the sub-
national model it was between .984 and 1.078. Given this is measure of political, civil, and human rights; 
it is worrisome that these rights, which we take for granted in the West are not significantly impacting 
employment decision-making. With neoliberal models espoused by the international financial community 
in the 1980s revolving around trends toward fiscal decentralization and income improvements as more 
important than the political environment, this rather disappointing finding may only lend further weight to 
economic models of development. However, at this stage, given the drastic reduction in countries actually 
covered by these models as compared to the amount of data available (204 countries potential and 
between 17 and 40 countries actually entered into the models), it is inappropriate to make any narrow (or 
even broad) statement regarding the meaning of this tentative results. Without future research into 
whether these countries have legitimate and enforceable equal opportunity laws, these findings must 
remain highly preliminary. 
 The statistical significance of higher levels of income as a predictor of female employment within 
the central and sub-national governments was not surprising. Like the other variables, the countries 
included in my models were biased toward those countries with higher levels of income. With potential of 
182 countries and nearly 2,500 observations this variable had the greatest breadth of information. With 
incomes per capita ranging from $57 (Liberia) to nearly $50,000 (Luxembourg) there was a wide range of 
income differentials. The mean value of all possible data points was $5,710, an amount that is nearly 
doubled for the countries included in the central government model and then more than tripled for those 
included in the sub-national models. Without further gendered data from the poorer countries we cannot 
yet make an assumption that the poorest countries are least likely to have female employees at either level 
of government. With lower-middle income countries like the Philippines averaging more than 50 percent 
female employment at the central government level, it is far from clear if any pattern among the poorest 
countries can be discerned at this stage. 
 Finally, the percentage of female parliamentarians was included in one sub-model for each of the 
central and sub-national levels. Its statistical significance at the central government level, but not at the 
sub-national level is puzzling. The sub-national level had statistical significance of .106 just missing the 
90 percent confidence level. However, in neither the broadly available data (178 countries and over 1,400 
observations) nor the models did the mean percentage of female parliamentarians ever exceed 23 percent. 
With the wide difference between female representation at the central government or even sub-national 
levels in comparison to the parliament, there are at least two implications. The first is that its statistical 
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significance in the central government model implies that gendered employment within countries is tied 
across employment sectors. More importantly, however, it may imply that it is more difficult for women 
to serve in a parliamentary capacity than in a civil servant capacity. Reasons for this are unknown in part 
because these two subjects are rarely studied in unison. It can be surmised, however, that the elected 
nature of the parliamentary position, the need to gather broad-based support across genders and the high 
hourly commitment for such tasks may disfavor women across countries. 
 
NEXT STEPS: MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS 
 
 It is clear from the above findings that there remain more questions than answers. This appears to 
be a reasonable conclusion given that this is the first time any cross-national study on representative 
bureaucracy has been undertaken. From a practical standpoint, there further data collection is required. 
Data collection was hampered not by insufficient data on my political or economic indicators, but on the 
fiscal decentralization and the percentage of female civil servants. Both of these data points require more 
intensive data collection with more emphasis on record maintenance than the other two variables. With 
voice and accountability indexed based on what not just in-country, by external to the country assessment, 
its reliance on local data collection is less pronounced than the other variables. Even income per capita is 
relatively simple to collect. Today, countries have excellent notions of what their earned income was, is 
and will be. Financial transactions, loans, exports, imports, all rely on the same accounting techniques. In 
contrast, fiscal decentralization requires more complex data collection. Its primary units of data collection 
occur at the sub-nationals levels where accounting knowledge and expertise can vary widely or even, in 
some cases, be little emphasized if there are few if any expenditure or revenue responsibilities. Similar 
logics exist for collecting gender data. Interestingly, this paper was originally planned to be a discussion 
of ethnicity within civil services around the world. However, to-date, I have yet to find one reliable 
measure of ethnic representation and thus, turned my attention to women where data is relatively, at least, 
more plentiful. Moreover, the value that Western cultures place on workplace diversity is written in laws 
and regulations. If countries do not hold similar values, the notion of even collecting this type of 
information would not even be considered. 
 Beyond these practical difficulties is a much broader and more international problem. When we 
look at the Millennium Development Goals, one of the eight goals is to improve gender equity by 2015. 
Rightfully, one of the indicators for measuring progress toward this goal is increasing the number of 
female parliamentarians. The assumption that women, once in parliament, are more likely to act for 
women is ingrained within this measurement. However, there is no such priority for female representation 
within the civil services. Whether this is because the neoliberally minded policymakers stop their 
understanding of the bureaucracy at Weber or if representativeness is considered more valuable 
legislatively than bureaucratically or even if the notion of diversity law is infrequently studied cross-
nationally, it is uncertain. Moreover, my data indicate that more women are serving in central government 
and even sub-national government in many cases than they are in parliaments. The implications of these 
trends remain unstudied. Despite this conclusion, with there is no international agreement behind an idea, 
there is no data collection. Just fifteen years ago, the idea that “governance” mattered for economic 
development was not broadly accepted within development circles. Today, you cannot read an article 
about international development without some mention of a project, agency or national governance 
structure, function, process or interaction. Data discussing various aspects of governance, including its 
effectiveness and efficiency are found nearly everywhere. Discussion about its representativeness is not. 
This is a problem that requires more practical and theoretical highlighting. 
 The paper indicates that across countries there is a clear preference for women to encompass a 
larger percentage of the sub-national workforce than at the national levels. This observation, while 
noticed within the U.S.-based literature, requires further international attention. Its parallel with studies on 
the legislative branches in federalized countries may provide an additional avenue of study. Considering 
these outcomes from a social perspective, what is it about local or state/provincial civil servant positions 
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that are more appealing to females? Is it a question of policy impact? Do women feel that have more 
impact within their home regions as opposed to working at the national levels? Or perhaps it is a question 
of family. Is it because civil service jobs are closer to the home that women feel more able to work within 
the sub-national level public services? Or maybe it is about job stature. Are the civil service jobs within 
sub-national governments more likely to have administrative roles, roles that women are more likely to 
fill? Or perhaps there is even a linkage between female parliamentarians and job opportunities for women 
within the civil service? Or that local level agencies tend to be more human and social service oriented 
and thus, attract more women employees? 
 More specific to the representative bureaucracy literature in the United States, none of the 
available cross-national data is able to even being to answer many of the questions currently researched 
within representative bureaucracy. Does the passive representation that I profiled in this paper lead to 
active representation? When and where might this linkage be made? Looking at the national and sub-
national agency leadership, do we find more male agency heads at the national level than the state or local 
levels and thus, more men than women working within the national level agencies? These questions 
required further in-country research for the answers to be found. 
And finally and perhaps more relevant for this paper, do levels of representative bureaucracy vary 
across cultures or over time? Does the premise that there is no politics-administration dichotomy have to 
hold before representative bureaucracy considered a valid concept on its own? If indeed, there is a 
dichotomy then it may matter little how representative our bureaucracies are or are not. What about 
cultures where bureaucratic positions are held in high regard and are given only to the very best students? 
Would those countries still value representativeness over some measure of intelligence or fit? What about 
the opposite scenario? In countries where bureaucratic jobs are generally considered the least desirable, 
would that impact representativeness? Would countries where bureaucratic jobs are given out by political 
leaders to ensure political stability or support have different results from the other type of countries? 
Looking more structurally, do societies with high ratios of executive to legislative power view 
representativeness differently from those where the legislative branches hold significant power? 
These are just some of the questions that can be raised when one undertakes cross-national 
research on representative bureaucracy. It forces scholars and policymakers not only to think about others 
outside our country, but perhaps in an ironic twist, to think more about ourselves as well. Is the United 
States unique? Seemingly not when we can also find women are more likely to be employed at the sub-
national as opposed to the national levels. There is clearly something causing this cross-national 
observation to exist. Moreover, the fact that national income matters for seeking civil service employment 
is intriguing. The implication may be that in poorer countries formal sector jobs are few and far between 
and thus, tend to be reserved for men or more generally, for the gender with the highest literacy rate, 
which is also tends men. For countries currently considered underdeveloped, excluding women from civil 
service jobs and thus, out of the national policy conservations, may be assisting in the country’s continued 
underdevelopment. If we believe that civil servants are not Weberian implementers, the civil services run 
by, and controlled by, men may be less likely to solicit or understand the viewpoint of one half of their 
society. As the first of its kind, this paper is far from providing any answers. However, it is hopefully an 
early step toward discussing Milton Esman’s observation about the positive linkages among 




Table 1: Percentage of Female Civil Servants at the National and Sub-National Levels (United States) 
  Percent (%) of Female Civil Servants 
Year Central Government Sub-National Government 
1996 43.8% 57.4% 
1997 44.2% 57.8% 
1998 42.7% 58.2% 
1999 42.4% 58.6% 
2000 43.0% 58.8% 
2001 41.5% 59.2% 
2002 41.8% 59.6% 
2003 42.5% 59.3% 
2004 42.8% 59.1% 
2005 N/A N/A 





Table 2: Values for Each Variable (United States Only) 
  United States 
Variable Only 
% Women (Central) 42.7
  




Voice & Accountability 1.261
  
GDP per capita (US$ 2000)  $       32,788 
  
% Female Parliamentarians 13.467




Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for All Available Data Points 
All Variables 
Obs Countries Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
476 87 41.216 12.104 8.333 67.592
178 32 50.357 21.163 11.111 84.211
389 68 23.697 14.129 1.764 58.730
1361 204 -0.032 1.005 -2.379 1.712
2446 182  $  5,710  $  8,681  $   57   $ 49,980 
1415 178 13.014 8.858 0.300 49.000
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for All Available Data Points (Central Government Models Only) 
Central Government Model (Maximum Available) 
Obs Countries Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
-- -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- --
247 -- 23.213 14.176 2.444 55.619
444 -- 0.409 0.837 -2.020 1.712
303 --  $  8,227  $ 10,258  $  114   $ 44,758 
1415 -- 14.554 10.194 1.000 45.000
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for All Available Data Points (Sub-National Government Models Only) 
Sub-National Government Model (Maximum Available) 
Obs Countries Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
-- -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- --
66 -- 28.455 15.602 2.444 55.619
93 -- 0.895 0.729 -1.358 1.712
172 --  $ 14,678  $ 12,865  $  114   $ 44,758 





Table 6: C1 Model, Descriptive Statistics 
Central Government Model (C1) 
(With Fiscal Decentralization, No Parliament) 
Obs Countries Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
50 30 43.817 11.606 8.333 66.605
50 30 24.286 14.777 2.773 55.619
50 30 0.696 0.771 -1.358 1.712
50 30  $ 10,789  $ 11,251  $  394   $ 35,855 
50 30 -- -- -- --
 
Table 7: C2 Model, Descriptive Statistics 
Central Government Model (C2) 
(With Fiscal Mean, No Parliament) 
Obs Countries Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
163 40 44.792 11.500 8.333 66.605
163 40 21.404 14.109 2.194 54.843
163 40 0.679 0.683 -1.358 1.712
163 40  $  9,590  $ 11,226  $  394   $ 44,757 
163 40 -- -- -- --
 
Table 8: C3 Model, Descriptive Statistics 
Central Government Model (C3) 
(With Fiscal Mean & Female Parliamentarians) 
Obs Countries Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
128 37 45.498 11.598 8.682 66.605
128 37 21.641 13.879 2.194 48.018
128 37 0.740 0.639 -1.036 1.703
128 37  $ 10,260  $ 11,676  $  422   $ 44,758 





Table 9: SN1 Model, Descriptive Statistics 
Sub-National Government Model (SN1) 
(With Fiscal Decentralization, No Parliament) 
Obs Countries Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
28 17 54.768 23.751 11.594 83.942
28 17 29.281 16.227 2.773 55.619
28 17 0.998 0.745 -1.358 1.712
28 17  $ 16,031  $ 12,452  $  394   $ 35,855 
28 17 -- -- -- --
 
Table 10: SN2 Model, Descriptive Statistics 
Sub-National Government Model (SN2) 
(With Fiscal Mean, No Parliament) 
Obs Countries Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
87 24 53.489 21.540 11.594 83.942
87 24 28.091 14.449 2.991 54.843
87 24 0.984 0.642 -1.358 1.712
87 24  $ 15,608  $ 13,002  $  394   $ 44,758 
87 24 -- -- -- --
 
Table 11: SN3 Model, Descriptive Statistics 
Sub-National Government Model (SN3) 
(With Fiscal Mean & Female Parliamentarians) 
Obs Countries Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
68 22 55.56 20.459 14.035 83.217
68 22 28.591 13.861 2.991 48.018
68 22 1.078 0.511 -0.472 1.703
68 22  $ 17,010  $ 13,152  $  422   $ 44,758 





Table 12: Central Government Results (Panel-Corrected Time Series) 
 Central Government Models 
 Model C1  Model C2  Model C3 
 
Fiscal 
Decentralization  Fiscal Mean  Fiscal Mean 
 No Parliament  No Parliament  With Parliament 
  Coefficient   Coefficient   Coefficient 
Variables (Standard Error)   (Standard Error)   (Standard Error) 
Fiscal Decentralization -0.003*** -0.004***  -0.004***
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)
Voice & Accountability -0.006 0.022  0.011
 (0.023) (0.168)  (0.023)
GDP per capita (US$)(2000)(log) 0.041** 0.055***  0.030*
 (0.120) (0.015)  (0.017)
% Women Parliament (log) -- --  0.023*
 -- --  (0.013)
Observations 50 163  128
Countries 30   40   37
* P < 0.1, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01 
 
Table 13: Sub-National Government Models (Panel-Corrected Time Series) 
  Coefficient   Coefficient   Coefficient 
Variables (Standard Error)   (Standard Error)   (Standard Error) 
Fiscal Decentralization -0.000 0.003  0.002
 (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003)
Voice & Accountability -0.016 0.022  -0.016
 (0.027) (0.036)  (0.016)
GDP per capita (US$)(2000)(log) 0.112*** 0.087***  0.132**
 (0.025) (0.001)  (0.052)
% Women Parliament (log) -- --  -0.063
 -- --  (0.039)
Observations 28 87  68
Countries 17  24  22
* P < 0.1, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01. Sub-National Model Standard Errors are Robust Standard Errors. 





Table 14: Countries Included in Models, By Income Category 
  World Central Government Models Sub-National Government Models
  Bank C1 C2 C3 SN1 SN2 SN3 
Low Income Countries 54 1 1 1 1 1 1 
% of Total: 26.0% 3.3% 2.5% 2.7% 5.9% 4.2% 4.5% 
        
Lower-Middle Income Countries 58 5 9 7 2 4 2 
% of Total: 27.9% 16.7% 22.5% 18.9% 11.8% 16.7% 9.1% 
        
Upper-Middle Income Countries 40 12 16 16 4 6 6 
% of Total: 19.2% 40.0% 40.0% 43.2% 23.5% 25.0% 27.3% 
        
High Income Countries 56 12 14 13 10 13 13 
% of Total: 26.9% 40.0% 35.0% 35.1% 58.8% 54.2% 59.1% 
                




Table 15: Countries Included in Models 
  Countries in Models 
Models Low Income Lower-Middle Income Upper-Middle High Income 
Central Government Models     



























Model C2 India 
Albania, Azerbaijan, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, 
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i Following the Meier, Wrinkle & Polinard article, a debate ensued about their methodological approach (Meier, 
Eller, Wrinkle, & Polinard, 2001; Nielsen & Wolf, 2000). 
ii Another potential reason cannot be ignored. Via its founding articles, one of the most powerful international 
financial institutions, the World Bank, is not allowed to engage in overt political advising. Of course, anti-Bank 
activists might argue that everything the Bank does is political and for the purposes of this paper one could envision 
that encouraging representativeness is akin to political advising. While encouraging representative bureaucracy 
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might be linked to the Bank’s broader objectives of encouraging broad-based legitimacy, it is suspected by this 
author that the efficiency-first objectives that parlay into its neoliberal framework and their understanding of 
bureaucrats at essentially Weberian providers of policy directives are more important than any worry about the 
perceived politicization of the World Bank’s policy advice. 
iii Between 1951 and 1962, the UN, USAID, and the Ford Foundation spent nearly $250 million on administrative 
reform. This money “supported some seventy-five training institutions and trained at least seven thousand persons in 
public administration” (Braibanti, 1970). 
iv Political (also called electoral) decentralization is number of jurisdictions at the sub-national level. These 
jurisdictions may or may not have an elected leader. These jurisdictions are presumed to have a civil service, even if 
just one or two staff. The World Bank defines administrative decentralization as seeking to “redistribute authority, 
responsibility and financial resources for providing public services among different levels of government” 
(WorldBank, n.d.-a). 
v Units of analysis included particular central government (federal) agencies (Hindera, 1993; Meier & Nigro, 1976; 
Naff, 2001; Soni, 2000), states (Barnett, Baron, & Smart, 2000; Keiser, Wilkins, Meier, & Holland, 2002; Meier & 
Stewart Jr, 1992) and cities (Eisinger, 1982; Miller, Kerr, & Reid, 1999; Slack, 1987). 
vi What is considered “public sector” varies by country (Hammouya, 1999). The ILO cautions that there are not all 
countries use the same definitions of public sector and that the use of these definitions by countries can vary over 
time. Definitions of public sector used in this paper (depending upon data availability) can include the military 
services and state-owned enterprises. 
vii The ILO’s LABORSTA database did not provide gendered civil service data for either Russia or South Korea at 
the central and sub-national levels. Instead, this data was added to my database through the following two articles: 
(Brym & Gimpelson, 2004) for Russia, and (Kim & Yoon, 1996) for South Korea. 
viii An earlier version of this paper used only an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model.. However, a more 
appropriate methodological response to these data limitations is to employ a panel-corrected time series regression, 
which is the methodology of this paper. 
ix Since the voice and accountability index has data only for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002-2004, the maximum number of 
data points possible per country is six. 
x The mean value for the United States is included for comparison purposes since the majority of representative 
bureaucracy literature is based on a case study of one. 
xi It should be noted that just because there is a break in years it could mean either the ratios changed in the opposite 
direction, or more likely, that data is missing for one or more years. 
